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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Lynette Kornegay filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging that various Delaware law enforcement officers 
conducted an illegal search of her home in violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based 
upon their assertion of qualified immunity. For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse in part and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.1  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Kornegay raises four claims in this appeal: (1) the search warrant was 
facially defective in failing to state any facts from which the informant's 
reliability could be assessed; (2) detective Cottingham acted with reckless 
disregard for the truth in failing to disclose that his confidential 
informant was unreliable; (3) detective Cottingham acted unreasonably 
in believing that Shannon Selby could be found at 2611 N. Locust Street; 
and (4) the Crisis Management Tactical Team conducted an unlawful 
entry by failing to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement. 
We will affirm the decision of the district court on the first three claims 
without discussion. 
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I. 
 
Kornegay and her minor children moved into a house 
located at 2611 N. Locust Street, Wilmington, Delaware in 
April 1994. The previous tenant, Dorothy Selby, had moved 
from that address in January 1994. Her nephew, Shannon 
Selby ("Selby"), occasionally listed his aunt's address as his 
own. 
 
In April 1994, Selby became a suspect in the April 14, 
1994 murder of Montel Morgan. Wilmington police detective 
DeWayne Cottingham headed that investigation and, after a 
preliminary investigation into Selby's whereabouts, 
incorrectly concluded that Selby was living at 2611 N. 
Locust Street. Acting upon that belief, Cottingham applied 
for and obtained a search warrant for that address. The 
warrant listed Selby and the murder weapon as the 
subjects of the search even though Selby was not 
considered the shooter. His alleged involvement in Morgan's 
murder was telling the actual shooter to shoot Morgan. 
 
On May 5, 1994 at 6:00 a.m., members of the Crisis 
Management Tactical Team ("CMTT") executed the warrant 
which had been labeled "high risk" because Selby was 
wanted for Morgan's murder. The CMTT used a battering 
ram to break down the front door of 2611 N. Locust Street. 
Only after the door was broken in did the officers identify 
themselves by yelling "Police. Search Warrant." They 
entered each room with guns drawn yelling "Police. Search 
Warrant." In an upstairs bedroom, police found Kornegay, 
a male friend, Andre Alexander, and Kornegay's twenty- 
month old daughter in bed. The police ordered them not to 
move, and Alexander was dragged from the bed and 
handcuffed for a few minutes. Other officers brought 
Kornegay's seven-year old son from the adjacent room 
where he had been sleeping to his mother's room. He was 
harshly told to "get in to where they are." 
 
At that point, an officer downstairs called out "all clear", 
and the CMTT left the house. Kornegay and Alexander were 
given clothes to change into from their pajamas and 
brought downstairs. Once downstairs, Kornegay was given 
a copy of the search warrant. Only then did she learn that 
the police were searching for a murder suspect named 
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"Shannon Selby." In all, the CMTT remained in the house 
approximately five minutes. During that time, the officers 
restricted their search to behind furniture and the inside of 
closets. Only the front door was damaged. Kornegay and 
her children, however, were understandably frightened and 
upset by the incident. 
 
Kornegay subsequently filed a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of herself and her children against 
the officers who executed the search. She alleged that the 
officers had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by relying on a warrant that was facially 
defective and then searching their home in an 
unreasonable manner. The officers moved for summary 
judgment arguing that they were protected under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. The district court agreed 
and granted summary judgment. This appeal followed. 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 which gives us jurisdiction over "appeals from all 
final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 




Kornegay contends that there are issues of material fact 
regarding the reasonableness of the officers' conduct in 
executing the search warrant and that the district court 
therefore erred in granting them summary judgment. Our 
standard of review is plenary. 
 
Thus, `[we] review the district court's summary 
judgment determination de novo, applying the same 
standard as the district court. . . . [I]n all cases 
summary judgment should be granted if, after drawing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In their brief, the appellants cite the collateral order doctrine as the 
basis for our appellate jurisdiction. However, the authorities they cite for 
that proposition all involve cases in which summary disposition was 
denied the government actors. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d 
267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 829-30 (8th 
Cir. 1983). Here, the district court granted summary disposition to the 
officers. Thus, the appellants are appealing afinal order of that court, 
and, therefore, our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the 
court concludes that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact to be resolved at trial and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 




"Government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages if their 
conduct does not violate clearly established . . . 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
"[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officers will in 
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that [their 
conduct was lawful]." Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 
F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we do not 
inquire into whether these defendants violated the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, we must determine 
if a reasonable fact finder could conclude that their conduct 
did not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable 
person would have known. Qualified immunity turns on the 
reasonableness of the officers' belief that their conduct was 
legal not its legality per se. "To determine reasonableness, 
a reviewing court must ask `whether a reasonable person 
could have believed the defendant's actions to be lawful in 
light of clearly established law and the information he 
possessed.' " Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 
1996)(citation omitted); see also Shea, 966 F.2d at 130 
("[A]n official who conducts an illegal search may not be 
held personally liable if he could have reasonably believed 
that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment."). 
" `Clearly established rights' are those with contours 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. 
Since the instant challenge focuses in large part upon the 
officers' failure to knock and announce their presence, we 
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must determine the extent to which the "knock and 
announce" rule was a "clearly established" right when they 
searched Kornegay's home. 
 
A. The "Knock and Announce" Rule 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995). The 
"commonlaw requirement that police officers entering a 
dwelling must knock on the door and announce their 
identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry" is 
incorporated into the Fourth Amendment's guarantees. 
Richards v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1418 
(1997).3 This rule has come to be known as the "knock-and- 
announce" requirement and it "strikes the appropriate 
balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at 
issue in the execution of search warrants and the 
individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries." 
Id. at 1421-22. 
 
First, it reduces the likelihood of injury to police 
officers, who might be mistaken, upon an 
unannounced intrusion into a home, for someone with 
no right to be there. Second, it seeks to prevent 
needless damage to private property. Finally, it 
embodies respect for the individual's right of privacy, 
which is to be imposed upon as little as possible in 
making an entry to search or arrest. 
 
United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 596 (3d 
Cir.1983)(citations omitted). 
 
In United States v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1968), 
police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's house 
for gambling equipment. They attempted to gain entry to 
the house by inserting a crowbar into the door and prying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Richards was decided after the search at issue here and thus the 
officers who searched Kornegay's home cannot be charged with 
knowledge of it. However, we cite it because the case affirms the 
necessity for a case-by-case inquiry into the reasonableness of the police 
conduct under the law at the time of the search. 
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it open without first knocking or announcing their presence 
or purpose. As they were forcing the door, the defendant 
voluntarily opened it. We held that the entry was illegal 
because police failed to announce their purpose before 
using the crowbar to pry the door open. That case was 
decided nearly thirty years before the search at issue here. 
 
Even the highest court in the state where the instant 
search was executed had years ago declared a search 
unreasonable when police failed to comply with the knock- 
and-announce requirement. See Tatman v. Delaware, 320 
A.2d 750 (Del. 1974). In Tatman, police obtained a search 
warrant which they executed at 6:00 a.m. They knocked on 
the street door to the multi-family dwelling, waited a few 
seconds, and then used sledge hammers to break the door 
down. Police then went to the second-floor apartment 
described in the warrant and broke into that apartment 
without knocking or announcing their purpose. The court 
declared "[t]he no-knock search here was unreasonable and 
violative of Fourth Amendment requirements. Prior to the 
entry of a residence, the police officer is required by the 
common law, in executing a warrant, to signify the cause of 
his coming, and to make a request to open the doors." Id. 
at 750 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
As noted earlier, Richards v. Wisconsin reaffirmed the 
common law rule. In Richards, the defendant was convicted 
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute based 
upon evidence that was seized from his hotel room 
following a "no-knock" entry pursuant to a search warrant. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
denial of the defendant's suppression motion reasoning 
that, given the inherent danger of today's drug culture, 
"police officers are never required to knock and announce 
their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony 
drug investigation." Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1418. The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed holding that there could be no 
categorical exception to the rule. "Instead, in each case, it 
is the duty of a court confronted with the question to 
determine whether the facts and circumstances of the 
particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and- 
announce requirement." Id. at 1421. 
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A "no-knock" entry is justified when "the police [ ] have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their 
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective 
investigation of the crime." Id.; see also Wilson, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1918-19; United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381, 385- 
86 (3d Cir. 1971). Courts have upheld dispensing with the 
knock-and-announce requirement in four situations: (1) the 
individual inside was aware of the officers' identity and 
thus announcement would have been a useless gesture; (2) 
announcement might lead to the sought individual's 
escape; (3) announcement might place the officers in 
physical peril; and (4) announcement might lead to the 
destruction of evidence. See Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421; 
Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919; Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 
393, 397 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Stiver , 9 F.3d 298, 
302 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 
978 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
Here, the magistrate issued an ordinary warrant to 
search the residence at 2611 N. Locust Street. Such a 
warrant "authorize[s] an executing officer to enter the 
property where the search or seizure was to occur but 
would not confer `no knock' authority unless the warrant so 
indicated." Bodine, 72 F.3d at 396. Therefore, the officers 
are shielded by qualified immunity only if they "could 
reasonably have decided that an urgent need existed for 
such an entry into the premises." United States v. Stewart, 
867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1989). "To determine 
reasonableness, a reviewing court must ask itself `whether 
a reasonable person could have believed the defendant's 
actions to be lawful in light of clearly established law and 
the information he possessed.' The objective facts control a 
decision on summary judgment, regardless of allegations of 
intent." Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 
1996)(citation omitted). With these principles as our 
guidepost, we examine the actions of the officers here. 
 
B. The Officers' Information 
 
Detective Cottingham was assigned to investigate the 
April 14, 1994 murder of Montel Morgan, who had been 
shot in the stomach in a high-crime area of Wilmington 
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called "the Bucket." Cottingham learned from one witness 
that Shannon Selby told another individual at the scene to 
shoot Morgan. A second witness confirmed that someone 
other than Selby had shot Morgan but stated only that 
Selby was present. This witness did not implicate Selby in 
the shooting at all. Based upon this information, 
Cottingham obtained an arrest warrant for Selby charging 
him with first-degree murder, first-degree conspiracy, 
second-degree conspiracy, and tampering with a witness.4 
All of the murder-related charges were based on Selby's 
alleged encouragement of the shooter. It is undisputed that 
Cottingham did not think that Selby had shot Morgan. 
 
After obtaining the arrest warrant, detective Cottingham 
applied for a warrant to locate Selby. Although Cottingham 
initially found three different addresses for Selby among 
various police and court documents, a preliminary 
investigation suggested that Selby's correct address was 
2611 N. Locust Street. Residents in the Bucket confirmed 
that Selby lived in the vicinity, but they did not know 
where. A review of police records disclosed three different 
addresses for Selby, one of which, 2611 N. Locust Street, 
was in that area. The most recent arrest report listing N. 
Locust Street as Selby's address was from January 1993. 
Further investigation disclosed that a new telephone 
number had been issued to a "Dorothy Selby" at that 
address. Cottingham made no further effort to determine if 
that number was still assigned to that address, but he did 
call the number and ask for "Shannon Selby." He was told 
that Selby was not there. 
 
On May 4, 1994, detective Cottingham obtained a 
warrant to search 2611 N. Locust Street for Selby and the 
murder weapon. Cottingham decided to execute the warrant 
at 6:00 a.m. on the following day and requested that the 
Crisis Management Tactical Team ("CMTT") assist with the 
search. The warrant was labeled "high risk" because Selby 
was wanted in connection with a serious felony, and the 
weapon involved had not been recovered. The CMTT was 
instructed to consider Selby armed and dangerous. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The second witness reported to police that several individuals 
including Selby threatened her after the incident. 
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On May 5, 1994 at 6:00 a.m., the CMTT, wearing masks 
and bullet-proof vests, broke down the door at 2611 N. 
Locust Street. After the door was broken in, the officers 
yelled "Police. Search Warrant." The officers thereafter 
entered Kornegay's home and proceeded as set forth above 
in Part I. 
 
The district court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's 
Report and Recommendation that these "circumstances 
justified deviation from the knock and announce rule, as 
the high risk warrant was for a first degree murder suspect 
who was a known drug dealer with previous arrests for 
felony offenses involving the use of a weapon, and the gun 
used in the murder had not been recovered." App. at 46. 
We disagree. 
 
There is nothing in this record to suggest that the officers 
had information that the murder weapon was in Selby's 
possession. He did not fire the fatal shot, he was not even 
reported to have been armed at the murder scene, and 
nothing suggests that the police had information that the 
shooter gave Selby the weapon after the shooting. The mere 
fact that the shooting occurred and the murder weapon was 
not recovered does not establish that Selby was in 
possession of it with such certainty that the officers' 
conduct can be ruled reasonable as a matter of law. 
"[O]fficers must have more than a mere hunch or suspicion 
before an exigency can excuse the necessity for knocking 
and announcing their presence. . . . [W]e will closely 
scrutinize officers making a forced entry without first 
adequately announcing their presence and purpose." 
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Moreover, allegations of Selby's past drug dealing and 
prior arrests for violent crimes do not suspend the knock- 
and-announce rule. See Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421. A 
reasonable jury could conclude that the reasons offered in 
support of this search merely "consisted of generalities that 
bore no relation to the particular premises being searched 
or the particular circumstances surrounding the search." 
United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 585 (10th Cir. 
1989). That conclusion suggests either that the officers' 
concern that Selby was armed and dangerous was 
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unreasonable or that the officers employed a generalized 
procedure that was unreasonable as applied to Kornegay's 
home. 
 
"In order to justify a `no-knock' entry, the police must 
have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing 
their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective 
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence." Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421 
(emphasis added). The ordinary risks that surround a 
general category of criminal behavior are insufficient by 
themselves to create an exigent circumstance. See id. 
(refusing to create a blanket exception to the knock-and- 
announce rule for felony-drug investigations because of the 
danger they involve and the ease of destroying drug 
evidence); see also United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Stewart, 867 F.2d at 584-85."If a per se 
exception were allowed for each category of criminal 
investigation that included a considerable--albeit 
hypothetical--risk of danger to officers or destruction of 
evidence, the knock[-]and-announce element of the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be 
meaningless." Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421. 
 
In United States v. Stewart, federal agents obtained a 
warrant to search the defendant's house for drugs and 
weapons based on evidence that he had supplied the drugs 
involved in two previous undercover purchases and that 
"substances traffickers do commonly possess and carry a 
firearm." Stewart, 867 F.2d at 582. The search was 
executed by the Denver S.W.A.T. team in accordance with 
the pre-arranged plan to use "a two-man steel battering 
ram to break down the front door and [then] immediately 
[throw] a full charge stun grenade into the living room." Id. 
at 583. Before breaking in the door, the S.W.A.T. team did 
not knock and announce its presence. The subsequent 
search uncovered drugs and other paraphernalia, cash, and 
a loaded, semi-automatic pistol. Stewart entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to distributing cocaine but 
reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. In the appeal that followed, the court of appeals 
reversed. It reasoned, in part, that 
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[t]he officers had no information that would have led 
them to believe that the defendant armed himself on a 
regular basis. The officers thus had no information 
whether firearms were present within the house. The 
one incident involving the defendant and a pistol took 
place away from the defendant's house. [Thus a]ny 
conclusions regarding the presence of firearms on the 
premises were purely conjectural. 
 
Id. at 585. The same situation exists here with regard to 
the officers' concern that Selby was armed, and it was 
therefore for a jury to determine the reasonableness of this 
entry as a matter of fact and not for a court to determine 
as a matter of law. 
 
Richards makes clear that the risks generally 
surrounding murder investigations did not necessarily 
create an exigent circumstance in this case. See Richards, 
117 S. Ct. at 1421. We recognize that, as a practical 
matter, officers effectuating an entry into a criminal 
suspect's home might prefer to do so without first 
announcing their presence. However, the Constitution 
simply does not permit that practice in all instances. 
Consequently, officers who act unreasonably cannot place 
themselves beyond exposure to liability nor complain if they 
are held accountable by persons such as Kornegay merely 
because the more "prudent" entry is the unannounced one. 
Often it is "reasonable" under a section 1983 analysis to 
choose that method of entry. However, in view of the 
weighty Fourth Amendment concerns at stake and the 
sanctity of one's dwelling, it will not always be so. Indeed, 
section 1983 liability for violations of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments would be all but eviscerated if we 
were to hold that an unannounced entry into one's home is 
always "reasonable" because it provides a greater measure 
of safety to police.5 Cf. id. ("[T]he fact that felony drug 
investigations may frequently present circumstances 
warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the 
neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Of course, we do not suggest that these officers ought to be liable 
under section 1983. We only hold that a jury must assess the 
reasonableness of their conduct. 
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the police decision not to knock and announce in a 
particular case."). 
 
Nothing in the record before us suggests that the officers 
here had information that Selby regularly carried a weapon 
or kept weapons in his home. The officers merely knew that 
Selby was a "known drug dealer with previous arrests for 
felonies including Robbery First Degree and Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony." App. 
at 47. A reasonable jury could conclude that this 
information was not sufficiently particular to excuse the 
officers' failure to knock and announce their presence 
before breaking down the door to Kornegay's home. "An 
individual's privacy interests are nowhere more clearly 
defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the 
home the core of fourth amendment rights." Wanger v. 
Bowner, 621 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)). 
 
As noted above, the officers knew that Selby had not shot 
the murder victim nor did they have evidence that he 
possessed the gun that was used. Moreover, the officers 
had conflicting evidence about whether Selby was even 
involved in the murder of Morgan. Two witnesses placed 
him at the scene of the murder, but only one said that he 
had played any role in it. 
 
Finally, a jury could find that any exigency surrounding 
the circumstances of this case was eliminated by the 
officers' decision to execute the search at 6:00 a.m. One of 
the officers who executed the warrant explained that the 
reason the CMTT selected that time was because "usually 
the person is in bed . . . for [our] safety we do [them] at that 
time, there [are] no people on the street . . . the school 
children [are not] out or anything like that, and . . . to get 
the people in bed." App. at 84 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, we cannot conclude on the facts of this case that 
there is no issue of material fact as to whether the CMTT's 
execution of the search violated clearly established 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have been aware. 
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IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Kornegay's claim 
that the CMTT's execution of the search violated the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments but affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on her other claims. We remand to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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